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Preface 
If international trade is not governed by rules, mere 
might dictates what is right. The World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) serves as a place where trade policy issues 
are addressed, disputes arbitrated, legal frameworks 
derived and enforced. Through these functions, the 
WTO ensures that the rules of trade policy are inspired 
by fairness and reciprocity rather than national interest. 
It is more important than ever to vitalize the global pub-
lic good that it represents against various threats that 
have been undermining it. 
Therefore, the Global Economic Dynamics project of 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a High-
Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade  
                                                     
1 The analysis and suggestions made in this document re-
flect the dominant view among the members of the Expert 
Board.  Members of the Board participated in meetings on a 
 
 
Governance. Composed of eminent experts and sea-
soned trade diplomats, it elaborated a series of feasible 
policy recommendations that will increase the effective-
ness and salience of the WTO. We hope that this Re-
port provides helpful suggestions in a time marked by 
increasing trade disputes and protectionism and in-
stead contributes to stronger multilateral institutions 
and fora.1 
Aart De Geus   Andreas Esche 
CEO and Chairman Director, Megatrends 
Bertelsmann Stiftung Bertelsmann Stiftung
personal basis – the views expressed should not be at-
tributed to any of the organizations Expert Board members 
are affiliated with. 
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Introduction 
The global trading system has helped many countries 
to increase economic growth and reduce poverty. 
Many countries, both developed and developing, have 
greatly expanded their participation in international 
trade, benefitting from lower prices, greater variety and 
higher productivity. The rapid growth in global trade 
shares of developing economies and the underlying in-
crease in output have been associated with rising av-
erage per capita incomes and reductions in rates of 
poverty.   
The global trade regime is a major success story of 
multilateral cooperation. But success has also brought 
challenges in its wake. The rapid increase in global 
output and trade shares of emerging economies, es-
pecially China, has given rise to perceptions that this 
is due in part to commercial practices that distort 
trade. Competition between governments to stimulate 
domestic economic activity has led to increasing trade 
tensions. Unilateral imposition of protectionist 
measures and retaliatory responses constitutes a sys-
temic threat to the trade regime.   
Rising public concern in many countries that trading 
partners use policies that advantage national firms – 
policies that seek to induce companies to ‘make it 
here,’ not ‘in the world’ – prompts calls for revisiting 
the bargains struck at the time the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO) was created (1995) and China acceded 
to the organization (2001). Updating the rulebook is 
also required to bolster the governance framework for 
cross-border flows of services and digital products as-
sociated with the development and use of new tech-
nologies such as artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and 
automation. 
WTO members are doing too little to confront and ad-
dress these challenges. The organization is stalled. 
The core negotiation, transparency, and conflict reso-
lution functions are increasingly questioned, undermin-
ing the credibility of the institution and its ability to sup-
port cooperation on trade matters: 
 WTO members failed to conclude the first 
round of multilateral trade negotiations 
launched under WTO auspices in 2001: the 
Doha Development Agenda. 
 
 There is increasing recourse to trade-distorting 
measures by some WTO members. 
 
 Since 2016, deadlock on the negotiation front 
has been complemented by an inability to ob-
tain the consensus needed for new appoint-
ments to the WTO Appellate Body, threatening 
the dispute settlement function. 
 
 Many WTO members are not living up to their 
notification commitments, reducing transpar-
ency of their trade policies and impeding the ef-
fectiveness of many WTO bodies in overseeing 
implementation of WTO agreements. 
 
 Members have not been willing to discuss a 
new work program for the organization that 
spans both outstanding ‘Doha subjects’ such 
as agricultural support policies and matters not 
on the Doha agenda that are giving rise to 
trade tensions. 
The trading system is in crisis. Urgent action is needed 
to revitalize the WTO. Such action must come from its 
members in a bottom-up process and be based on re-
newed multilateral dialogue on the deployment and ef-
fects of trade-distorting policies in both developed and 
developing nations. Dialogue is also required to re-
solve conflicts regarding the operation of the dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
All WTO members stand to gain from concerted efforts 
to cooperate on trade-related policies and address the 
underlying source of trade tensions. This applies as 
much to the US as it does to China, India, other Asian 
nations, African countries, the EU or any other WTO 
member:  
 Large OECD trading powers such as the EU, 
Japan and the US need a functioning multilat-
eral trade regime because most of the con-
cerns they have raised regarding foreign trade 
practices cannot be addressed effectively – or 
efficiently – on a bilateral basis. Any deal with 
one country will be eroded by a mix of market 
forces that drive investment towards other 
countries. Many trade practices that create 
negative spill-over effects are not unique to one 
country. 
 
 Large emerging economies need a functioning 
multilateral trade system because they do not 
have bilateral or regional trade agreements 
with their main trading partners and have not 
participated in recent efforts to conclude 
deeper economic integration arrangements. 
The WTO provides the primary locus where 
they can join in setting the rules for new areas 
of policy where they have a substantial stake – 
such as e-commerce or digital trade and invest-
ment. 
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 Developing countries need a functioning multi-
lateral trade regime because they have little 
market or negotiating power vis-à-vis large 
trading nations or blocs. The rules-based multi-
lateral trading system provides the foundation 
for the efforts of many developing countries to 
integrate markets on a regional basis. An im-
portant example is the African initiative to cre-
ate a continent-wide integrated regional market 
for goods and services. 
 
 Citizens of countries concerned with ensuring 
that trade supports societal goals and sustaina-
ble development need a functioning multilateral 
trade regime that upholds and bolsters the abil-
ity of governments to take actions to achieve 
these objectives.  
Many countries have turned to preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) to strengthen the governance of 
their commercial relations. Efforts to negotiate such 
agreements are prevalent in all parts of the globe. 
Some PTAs cover policies in areas such as e-com-
merce, competition policy and digital trade. Some are 
also used as an instrument to pursue external policy 
objectives, including in areas such as labour and envi-
ronmental standards. Participating in trade agree-
ments offers a complementary vehicle for cooperation 
to countries willing to deepen integration of markets, 
but this is not a viable alternative for many developing 
countries and risks fragmenting the rules that apply to 
global value chains. Nor will such agreements disci-
pline key trade-distorting instruments such as subsi-
dies. PTAs offer only partial solutions to companies 
seeking less policy uncertainty and fragmentation of 
regulatory regimes. Moreover, they depend on the 
strong foundation of basic rules provided by the WTO.  
A basic function of the WTO is to provide a platform 
for countries to agree on rules for trade-related poli-
cies that damage trading partners and to support their 
implementation. The fact that it is not fulfilling this pur-
pose matters for the global economy. Safeguarding 
the WTO is important for all its members, large and 
small, but especially for the latter. Only the multilateral 
trading system offers small countries the opportunity to 
influence the development of new trade rules.  
What could be done? 
Six recommendations 
Re-vitalizing the WTO as a venue for multilateral coop-
eration requires a willingness on the part of members 
to identify and discuss perceived problems and ex-
plore potential solutions. The WTO provides extensive 
flexibility for members’ engagement with each other. 
WTO members need to utilize this flexibility to address 
the underlying sources of trade tensions and deadlock, 
focusing on trade-distorting non-tariff policies in both 
developed and emerging economies that are not or 
are only incompletely covered by WTO disciplines. 
The prospects for doing so will be enhanced by initia-
tives to improve organizational performance as re-
gards implementation of agreements and dispute set-
tlement. 
1. Policy dialogue on policies affecting com-
petitiveness 
Escalation of the bilateral conflicts that give rise to uni-
laterally determined trade policies constitutes a seri-
ous threat to a rules-based trade regime. Resolving 
current trade tensions requires the major players to 
use the WTO for its original purpose: a forum for dis-
cussion, negotiation and dispute resolution. It is in the 
interest of all WTO members to make concerted ef-
forts to revisit the current rulebook and working prac-
tices – including the dispute settlement mechanism. 
The situation that has arisen with new appointments to 
the Appellate Body is one, urgent, example illustrating 
the need for open and frank dialogue on perceived 
problems and suggested solutions. The WTO dispute 
resolution system plays a vital role in sustaining coop-
eration between WTO members. Dealing with con-
cerns regarding how that system functions without un-
dermining the dispute settlement process’s operation 
must be a priority for the WTO membership.  
The first order of business for the WTO membership is 
to pursue efforts to defuse current trade conflicts, in-
cluding the dispute regarding the Appellate Body. 
Whatever choices are made by WTO members in ei-
ther launching or responding to trade policy actions, 
the appropriate path to contest perceived violations of 
WTO commitments is via the dispute settlement pro-
cedures. 
Sources of disagreement on issues and policies of 
systemic import require dialogue. A common under-
standing of the magnitude and incidence of negative 
spill-over effects of contested policies is a precondition 
for cooperation and potential rule-making efforts. Simi-
larly, a process of open deliberation is required to 
agree on a roadmap for addressing concerns about 
how the Appellate Body operates.   
Such processes require a willingness by the major 
players to engage with each other. There is no com-
pelling reason for them not to do so, nor are there 
good reasons why any WTO member should seek to 
block such engagement. This should be the bread and 
butter of the WTO – it is a core function. The aim 
should be to identify a work program to define an 
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agenda and roadmap to resolve recent trade tensions 
associated with the use of non-tariff policies, as well 
as outstanding subjects on the Doha Round agenda of 
great importance to many WTO members.   
Deliberation must be informed by factual assessments 
of the specific features of policies or situations giving 
rise to concern, and by analysis of the magnitude and 
incidence of any negative effects they generate. This 
is best done through working groups, supported by the 
secretariat with relevant information and objective 
analysis. Secretariat support is important as in practice 
only a small group will engage on most complex is-
sues. Good information is critical to this process. 
Moreover, greater transparency promoting better un-
derstanding of an issue area is a public good.  
It is critical that dialogue encompass issues that matter 
greatly to developing countries. Efforts to block delib-
eration on non-Doha issues arise not because coun-
tries do not see their salience for the WTO but be-
cause of a desire to see progress on policies that are 
priorities for many developing countries – such as tariff 
escalation in agricultural and natural resources sec-
tors. Balance is vital. 
Geopolitical tensions and associated national politics 
may preclude a consensus on launching the neces-
sary dialogue and eventual negotiations. WTO mem-
bers should not permit consensus to be a constraint in 
launching a process of policy dialogue. In many areas, 
it may be feasible to proceed on a plurilateral, critical 
mass basis. This may be a stepping stone towards an 
eventual broadly-supported agreement, but it may also 
be the best approach for some types of issues – e.g., 
instances where there are significant differences in so-
cial preferences or societal goals.  
2. Foster substantive deliberation in WTO 
bodies 
The WTO is a ‘member-driven’ organization. It works 
through many WTO Committees and other bodies in 
which all its members participate, subject to their 
choice. Bolstering the regular work of WTO bodies is 
one avenue for revitalizing the organisation’s delibera-
tive function. These entities provide venues for mem-
bers to discuss policies relevant to the respective sub-
ject areas covered by existing agreements and how 
these are changing. They provide opportunities for pol-
icy dialogue and consideration of options to avoid or 
limit adverse trade effects of policies that are not, or 
only partially, covered by current WTO agreements 
and member commitments.  
Self-reflection should include policy dialogue on 
emerging issues and areas of opportunity and more 
generally seek to (re-)establish a common understand-
ing of whether and how WTO bodies can be more use-
ful to the government departments in national capitals 
that deal with each of the issue areas they cover. One 
element of such a process is for WTO members to de-
termine what information they need to engage produc-
tively with each other in different WTO bodies. Non-
compliance with many of the notification requirements 
included in WTO agreements in a timely or compre-
hensive manner has become a source of contention. 
Rather than seeking to enforce compliance with all ex-
isting notification requirements, it would be more con-
structive for WTO Committees to ask themselves what 
information is needed to fulfil their mandate and most 
usefully help economic actors and citizens navigate 
and understand the trading system.  
Shifting the focus from a “business as usual” approach 
centred on defending long-standing positions on man-
dates and work programs of Committees and other 
WTO bodies to one that starts with members asking 
what each entity’s activities (tasks) should be and how 
they can more effectively pursue them may make the 
‘normal business’ activities of WTO bodies more sali-
ent to the constituencies with a stake in the subject ar-
eas covered by the different WTO agreements. 
A greater emphasis on jointly determining (learning 
about) what constitutes good practice in each of the 
policy areas covered by a Committee through sharing 
of national experiences, supported by background pa-
pers and analysis from the secretariat, could also form 
the basis of a more effective approach to dealing with 
economic development concerns. As each Committee 
brings together officials responsible for specific trade 
policies, they offer the opportunity to engage in deeper 
substantive discussions on what types of policies will 
foster sustainable development.  
A development-focused policy dialogue in the various 
WTO bodies could consider factual questions: What 
kind of treatment could help countries develop indus-
tries in sectors where they have comparative ad-
vantages? A basic focus of such discussion should be 
on identifying the scope for greater differentiation 
among developing countries on an issue-by-issue ba-
sis. 
The Committees are also appropriate venues for dis-
cussion of what can be learned from the operation of 
PTAs in their respective policy areas. PTAs may pur-
sue innovative approaches towards cooperation on 
trade policies. A regular focus at Committee level on 
national experiences with different PTAs would not 
only improve transparency, but more important, sup-
port a process of learning about approaches that might 
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be multilateralized through instruments such as a ref-
erence paper that countries could sign on to.    
It is vital that policy dialogue is framed as an open pro-
cess with a view to consider whether there is a prob-
lem and to learn from experience as opposed to start-
ing from the premise that this reflects a search for 
rules. The latter may well be a solution, but first it is 
necessary for there to be a common understanding of 
an issue and whether and how rules are needed to ad-
dress it. The process should not be framed as a prel-
ude to negotiations, as this is a key factor why some 
WTO members have opposed policy dialogue on new 
matters in the first place.  
3. Open plurilateral initiatives among WTO 
members 
Lack of consensus to discuss issues not covered by 
extant WTO agreements or included on the agenda of 
the Doha Round has been a factor impeding use of 
the WTO as a forum for policy dialogue. A partial solu-
tion to this problem is for groups of members to coop-
erate on an open, plurilateral basis and, where feasi-
ble, launch initiatives for specific sectors or policy ar-
eas.  Open plurilateral initiatives can be a vehicle for 
countries to consider adoption of common policy prin-
ciples such as regulatory coherence or to agree to 
new policy disciplines. Open plurilateralism has two 
key elements: any WTO member with an interest in 
participating is permitted to do so and the benefits of 
agreements are applied on a non-discriminatory basis 
to all WTO members (insofar as benefits are not con-
ditional on joint action by countries). Open plurilateral-
ism is a complement and alternative to the pursuit of 
PTA-based cooperation, which has the systemic dis-
advantage of being discriminatory in nature.  
Open plurilateral initiatives may not be feasible for pol-
icy areas where free riding is a significant concern. 
However, they offer an opportunity for countries to co-
operate on issue areas where the nature of the prob-
lem is to identify what constitutes good practice that 
will benefit participating countries independent of what 
non-participants do. Areas where this is likely to be the 
case include certain types of regulatory cooperation 
(where the focus is good practice) and ‘behind the bor-
der’ policies that apply equally to national and foreign 
firms or products.  
One area where open plurilateral initiatives could 
serve a useful function in supporting cooperation is as 
a means for members of PTAs to multilateralize spe-
cific ‘behind the border’ features of their PTAs – for ex-
ample, cooperation on competition policy, adoption of 
good practice for sector-specific regulation, or initia-
tives aimed at establishing the equivalence of policy 
regimes or mutual recognition. More generally, they 
can help countries exchange information on good 
practice and become focal points for international reg-
ulatory cooperation within specific sectors.  
The policy areas that could be the subject of open plu-
rilateral initiatives must be determined by (groups of) 
WTO members. Four such efforts were launched at 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in 
December 2017: on e-commerce, micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, investment facilitation and 
domestic regulation of services. The suggested pro-
cesses of policy dialogue on matters of systemic im-
port and self-reflection at the level of WTO Commit-
tees and other WTO bodies (recommendations 1 and 
2 above) will help identify policy areas that may lend 
themselves to open plurilateral initiatives.  
The scope for open plurilateral initiatives where bene-
fits are applied on a non-discriminatory basis is likely 
to be limited to issues that are either insensitive to free 
riding concerns or policy areas where a critical mass 
of WTO members participates. How much scope there 
is for such cooperation is an open question but may be 
greater than is often assumed, especially for technical 
issues where cooperation can reduce trade costs.  
Even where no agreement proves possible, the asso-
ciated deliberations are useful as they will help inform 
decisions on the set of issues that could be considered 
within a broader effort to construct a forward-looking 
agenda on updating rules that will apply to all WTO 
members. This could be supplemented with a transi-
tion-oriented approach that may combine elements of 
TFA and the telecom reference paper, i.e. a phase-in 
of obligations linked to some pre-accepted criteria 
from a list of obligations that combine mandatory and 
voluntary options. 
4. Use the Secretariat more effectively 
A corollary of the WTO being a ‘member-driven’ or-
ganization is that the secretariat is given very little 
voice.  Member-driven means members are responsi-
ble for conducting the WTO (i.e. taking decisions) but 
this need not translate into a monopoly on the right to 
voice views and supply relevant information to WTO 
members. Strengthening the secretariat’s ability to 
provide knowledge and analytical inputs to the mem-
bers will make it more useful to the constituencies that 
have a stake in enhancing the performance of WTO 
bodies.  
These constituencies are critical in sustaining political 
support for the organization. They are mostly located 
in the capital cities of WTO members. Enhancing the 
secretariat’s capacity to engage substantively on 
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trade-related policy areas of interest to national con-
stituencies may increase the perceived salience of – 
and political support for – the organization. There is 
substantial scope for reallocating available technical 
assistance funds to bolster engagement with national 
government agencies and broader constituencies that 
have an interest in different areas of trade policy.  
Committees and other WTO bodies and working 
groups need information synthesizing current 
knowledge on a range of trade-related areas, including 
on policies that are not, or only partially, covered by 
WTO agreements. Some of the inputs that Commit-
tees may identify as being needed as part of the self-
reflection process suggested above may be hard for 
members themselves to provide. Empowering the sec-
retariat to provide more support for the work of WTO 
bodies will permit the realization of economies of scale 
and scope, and increase the rate of return on the fi-
nancial resources provided by WTO members.  
Knowledge and analysis is particularly needed for 
‘new’ policy areas and to support subsets of WTO 
members that have decided to pursue open plurilateral 
initiatives on specific policy areas or sectors. More co-
operation with other international organizations dealing 
with different aspects of trade policy and related regu-
lation, as well as increasing engagement with interna-
tional business organizations, sectoral regulatory com-
munities and representative NGOs, can help to lever-
age what the secretariat can do in generating and syn-
thesizing available information and knowledge. 
Many citizens of WTO member states are concerned 
about the distributional effects of trade integration. 
While improving equity of outcomes and helping work-
ers and firms that incur adjustment costs are matters 
for national policy, more can and should be done to 
both monitor and assess the economic effects of im-
plementation of WTO agreements. Academic research 
tends to focus on trade impacts of WTO accession or 
the consequences of changes in specific national 
trade policies. What is missing is objective analysis of 
the effects of the rules-based trading system more 
broadly, including regular ex post monitoring and care-
ful examination of the implementation of WTO agree-
ments. This is a knowledge product that could be pro-
vided by the secretariat and that would help 
strengthen communications and outreach efforts (see 
recommendation 6 below). 
5. Review organizational performance 
The WTO is unique among international organizations 
in not having an independent evaluation office or an 
internal review mechanism that assesses its operation. 
At present there is too little focus on the functioning 
and performance of WTO bodies. As part of its over-
sight function, the WTO General Council conducts a 
year-end review of WTO activities, based on the an-
nual reports of its subsidiary bodies, but the latter 
simply summarize meetings and topics discussed. 
There is little substantive discussion in the General 
Council on the operating modalities of subsidiary bod-
ies. 
Periodic assessments of institutional performance can 
foster learning about what works well and what does 
not. Formal review mechanisms can act as a mirror for 
members, presenting them with facts they may not be 
fully aware of, as well as provide useful information for 
constructive engagement in considering what might be 
done to improve performance. 
Assessing the performance of the WTO as an organi-
zation and identifying areas where more regular inter-
action between WTO bodies can fill gaps or exploit 
synergies can make the organization more responsive 
and effective. Review of the regular work of the Com-
mittees can help identify differences in performance 
and the reasons for this, as well as inform assess-
ments whether successful practices might be emu-
lated in other areas. Consideration could be given to 
developing and reporting indicators of participation by 
members and engagement with stakeholders. The 
WTO annual report includes some measures of partici-
pation – such as the number of specific trade concerns 
raised in Committees and participation in dispute set-
tlement – but more specific metrics of performance 
could help identify opportunities for improvement.  
Collecting information that helps to apprise business 
and other national constituencies how governments 
are engaging and using the WTO would complement 
annual reporting by subsidiary bodies and the pro-
posed regular review of the latter’s operation to inform 
an annual discussion in the General Council as part of 
its broader appraisal of the functioning of the trading 
system.  
6. Outreach strategies 
Building on the previous suggestions, consideration 
should be given to re-thinking how the WTO commu-
nity – national political leaders (Ministers), WTO senior 
management, national trade officials, business repre-
sentatives, trade scholars – presents and discusses 
the purpose and performance of the multilateral trad-
ing system. Too often, public outreach and advocacy 
is framed in terms of the additional exports and jobs 
that will be generated by a new agreement. Some-
times this is based on economic models that may be 
easy targets for groups that oppose international trade 
cooperation and further integration of product markets.  
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WTO objectives range far beyond trade policy disci-
plines. The preamble of the WTO Agreement mentions 
improvement of living standards, preservation of natu-
ral resources, and attainment of sustainable develop-
ment, among other goals. Communication strategies 
should be based on what the WTO does (has done) to 
attain these common objectives – and where it has 
failed to do so. Given that a key function is to provide 
a platform for its members to establish rules and en-
force them, greater attention should be given to the 
role played by the organization in reducing uncertainty 
for firms and providing a mutually agreed governance 
framework that helps governments pursue welfare-en-
hancing policies. This extends far beyond the narrow 
interest of exporters – it benefits all citizens. Systemic 
stability and transparency about what governments do 
both in terms of national policies and of engagement in 
the WTO matters for citizens as well as firms.  
Several of the recommendations made above will gen-
erate information and data points that can feed into 
more effective and outreach strategies. What is miss-
ing is rich knowledge (evidence) on the ‘system at 
work’; how the procedural rules intended to reduce un-
certainty for traders do so; how this affects actual in-
vestment decisions by specific firms; what the WTO 
system does to help members address trade concerns 
raised by firms; what it does to give consumers access 
to better products and greater choice; etc. Such an ex-
ercise can leverage the review and self-assessments 
advocated above to highlight what is not working well 
and to do more to point out areas where WTO mem-
bers could do more to support the organization’s oper-
ation.  
The resurgence in unilateral trade policy by the United 
States and its refusal to agree to new appointments to 
the Appellate Body have increased awareness of the 
potential consequences of greater use of trade-dis-
torting measures. But this has not translated into a 
concerted defence of the rules-based trading system 
by the business community. It has become a platitude 
that world trade is organized in international supply 
chains and production networks, but the implications 
of this are imperfectly understood by workers, voters 
and politicians. Documenting at the firm/supply chain 
level how much local suppliers matter and how much 
employment is dependent on participation in produc-
tion networks can help counteract calls for protection-
ism. Many policymakers and citizens do not under-
stand the interdependence that is part and parcel of 
supply chain-based production and how much the as-
sociated web of contracts and investments is premised 
on a functioning system of rules and low and predicta-
ble trade costs. This is an area where business lead-
ers can and should do more to provide such infor-
mation to their workers and other stakeholders. 
Greater engagement by businesses may be encour-
aged by actions to promote more participation in the 
WTO’s activities, including the normal working of the 
Committees and other WTO bodies. This already hap-
pens to a small extent in some Committees. Such in-
teractions will help delegations to better understand 
how WTO agreements affect businesses, where there 
are concerns. Conversely, they may offer an oppor-
tunity for representatives on Committees to convey 
their perceptions or requests for information to the 
business community. Initiatives on these lines can put 
business to work in helping the WTO stay relevant for 
the global trade community collectively. 
Leadership 
The success of the multilateral trade regime in the 
post-Second World War period was attributable in 
large part to US leadership and the fact that the organ-
ization was dominated by broadly like-minded coun-
tries. Today, the US continues to participate actively in 
normal WTO work, but it is casting itself in a different 
role than in the past, calling for the WTO membership 
to pursue a reform agenda. It laid out its view of key 
elements of such an agenda at the 11th WTO Ministe-
rial Conference in Buenos Aires, stressing a need to 
focus on compliance with WTO obligations, for greater 
differentiation among developing countries, and action 
to ensure that litigation is not used as an alternative to 
negotiation. In May 2018 President Macron of France 
called for the largest trading powers to launch talks on 
WTO reform, to agree on what is wrong with the cur-
rent system and to develop a roadmap for new rules 
that address the distorting effects of subsidies and in-
dustrial development policies and measures to attain 
non-economic objectives.  
Policy dialogue, analysis and self-reflection are critical 
inputs into any WTO reform effort. A necessary condi-
tion is willingness to do so. A coordinated effort by 
large trade powers to invest more of their soft power to 
support initiatives on subjects that dialogue reveals 
are priorities for many WTO members can change the 
dynamics. Prospects for a successful WTO reform 
scenario to materialize will very much depend on 
whether China is willing to discuss possible ap-
proaches to addressing concerns regarding distortions 
to competition in its markets and levelling the playing 
field for foreign companies.  
Due in part to the rise of global value chains and the 
growth of emerging economies, many more countries 
are today participating in international trade. This cre-
ates opportunities for groups of WTO members to take 
on a greater role. Different possibilities may exist to 
constitute a critical mass large enough to provide lead-
ership. For instance, three of the four largest trading 
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powers – China, the EU and Japan – account for more 
than one-third of world trade in goods and services 
and more than half of the WTO budget. Jointly they 
can do much to respond to the challenges confronting 
the organization and revitalize the WTO. But leader-
ship cannot come from large trading powers alone. 
Safeguarding the WTO is particularly important for 
smaller countries, not least because only the multilat-
eral trading system offers them the opportunity to influ-
ence the development of new trade rules.  
Economies pursuing deep integration of markets are 
best placed to play a complementary role. Examples in-
clude the eleven members of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
the Pacific Alliance countries, the East Asian countries 
in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
and, more broadly, the WTO ‘Friends of the Multilateral 
System’ group of smaller economies.  Taken together 
with the EU, these countries collectively account for 
over 75 percent of world trade. They constitute a critical 
mass that is more than adequate to sustain multilateral 
cooperation and drive the trading system forward. 
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